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Recent Trends in California Law
Concerning the Best Interests
of the Child

"Stress has been laid in argument upon the welfare of the child,
her prosperity and happiness. We do not dwell upon such considerations, for they are foreign to the issue." Thus spoke the late
Justice Cardozo when handing down the New York Supreme
Court's opinion in the 1924 case, In Matter of Bistany.1 Justice
Marks of the Fourth District Court of Appeals reflected this continuing thread of reasoning when he stated in the 1947 case of
Adoption of McDonnell: 2 "It is conceivable, of course, that granting
the adoption might promote the moral and temporal interests of
the child. My investigation indicates that petitioners are persons
of high standing in their community and have ample financial resources to extend to the child comforts and advantages which otherwise might be denied her. Unfortunately, however, the law does
not permit me to give weight to such considerations. The rights
of the natural parents are paramount."
In the twenty-five years which have passed since Justice Marks
wrote these words, the legal attitude surrounding the law of adoption has shifted from primary and pre-emptive concern for the
rights and interests of the natural parents to one which now holds
paramount the best interests of the child. 3 There are other indicia
1. In Matter of Bistany, 239 N.Y. 19, 145 N.E. 70 (1924).
2. Adoption of McDonnell, 77 Cal. App. 2d 805, 176 P.2d 778 (1947).
See also, In re Kitchens, 116 Cal. App. 2d 254, 253 P.2d 690 (1953), a case
involving an agency adoption where the court analogized the agency to a
parent and required its consent as a jurisdictional pre-requisite to an
agency adoption, In re Bisenius, 173 Cal. App. 2d 518, 343 P.2d 319 (1959)

holding the welfare of the child is not an issue in abandonment proceedings,
and Ex parte Clark, 87 Cal. 638, 25 P. 967 (1891)

for the old rule that

adoption statutes being in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed in favor of the natural parents.
3. For some minor and major changes favorable to the child see:
In re Barents, 99 Cal. App. 2d 748, 222 P.2d 488 (1950), which analyzed a
1949 addition to CAL. CIV. CODE § 226 (West 1949), making consent in an
independent adoption revocable only with court approval. This case also
analyzed a 1945 addition to the CAL. CIV. CODE § 226 (West 1945), which
gave the court jurisdiction to proceed with an adoption despite the agency's

of change. Adoption and related proceedings have become more
adversary. Decisions made by adoption agencies as to what is best
for the child, once accepted as a matter of course, are no longer
adopted by the courts as conclusive of the matter. 4 In many instances the role of final arbiter is assumed by the court. 5 Additionally, prospective adoptive parents have taken a more vigorolps
attitude in the defense of their interests in, and the welfare of, the
adoptive child."
Consistent with these developments are several recent expansions of adoption and related law implementing the concept that
the interests of the child are of primary consideration. The first
area covered in this article concerns the appointment of a guardian
I

lack of approval or consent. See also, Adoption of D.S., 107 Cal. App. 2d
211, 236 P.2d 821 (1951), a case of independent adoption where the court
held the agency's consent to the adoption unnecessary and ordered the
adoption as in the best interests of the child; Adoption of McDonald, 43
Cal. 2d 447, 274 P.2d 860 (1954), a case of agency adoption where the court
held the agency's consent to the adoption unnecessary. Adoption of McDonald, supra, is distinguishable from In re Kitchens, supra note 2, since in
this case the child was relinquished but never placed with petitioners.
In re Kitchens, supra note 2, is still good law and the holding is codified
in CAL. CIV. CODE § 224n (West 1953) which remains an anachronism in
California's progressive adoption code.
For other changes reflecting the attitude of the courts and legislature
concerning the child's welfare see: Adoption of Laws, 201 Cal. App. 2d 494,
20 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1962), allowing the mother of an illegitimate child to act
on behalf of both parents in giving consent, and Adoption of Barnett, 54

Cal. 2d 370, 345 P.2d 18 (1960), overturning the strict construction rule of
the adoption statutes in favor of the natural parents. See also CAL. Civ.
CODE § 226 1 (d) (West 1963) which precludes the minority of the mother
as grounds for revocation of consent, and CAL. CIv. CODE § 227d (West 1951),
setting out a statute of limitations for adoptions. Compare, Arnold v.
Howell, 98 Cal. App. 2d 203, 219 P.2d 854 (1950), with Walter v. August, 186
Cal. App. 2d 395, 8 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1960), in regard to CAL. CIV. CODE § 227d
(West 1951).

4. One of the primary roles of adoption agencies is to furnish the
court with information concerning the child's suitability as a subject for
adoption, and the suitability of the adoptive parents. See CAL. Civ. CODE
§§ 226a, 226.6 and 227aaa (West 1973).' The agency filing the report can
make a favorable or unfavorable recommendation, but the court is not
bound although it will give the recommendation due weight in rendering
a decision.
5. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 224n, 222a, 226b, and 226.4 (West 1973).
6. The most recent development in support of this contention is the
case of Sacramento Super. Ct. v. Dept. of Soc. Wel., Cal. App. Rpt., Jan. 29,
1973, at 39. In this case the adoptive parents successfully challenged the
constitutionality of a part CAL. CIV. CODE § 224n (West 1970) on due process
grounds. The court held that where an adoption petition has not yet been
filed by the persons with whom the agency has placed the child and the
agency has decided to terminate placement, notice and a hearing must be
given the prospective parents. The scope of review of the agency's decision is a trial de novo and the central consideration is whether the abrogation of placement is justified in the best interests of the child.
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after relinquishment by the parent, and the second relates to a new
standard used in deciding whether a child is to be declared free
from the custody and control of his parents.
THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN AFTER RELINQUISHMENT

An adoption is accomplished in stages. Relinquishment of a child
to an agency is a necessary first stage if the natural parents have
chosen an adoption agency as the vehicle for placement of the
child. 7 The legal effect of relinquishment is that it severs the natural parents' rights to custody and control over the child, it places
custody and control in the agency, and it sets the child free for
adoption.8
Since the agency has custody of the child after relinquishment,
it becomes, in effect, the child's quasi-guardian. The legal relationship between a relinquished child and the adoption agency,
however, is distinguishable from legal guardianship in that the latter requires a legal proceeding.9 Still, the duties to the child of
the adoption agency and those of a legal guardian are similar.
Given these similarities, the question arises as to why anyone other
than the adoption agency should be appointed the guardian of a
relinquished child. In the normal course of events guardianship in
this situation is unnecessary. But there are cases where guardianship is not only desirable and convenient, but necessary to protect
the welfare of the child.
The appointment of a guardian after relinquishment has a limited history. Its occurrence is rare. In this author's knowledge
there are only three reported cases.' 0 The case which established
the precedent was Guardianship of Henwood." The minors in
Henwood, ages eight and five, were relinquished to an adoption
agency by their father after the mother's death. The grandparents
7. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 224m (West 1971) for the method of accomplishing a relinquishment. An alternative vehicle for placement of the child
is independent placement. See note 15 for an explanation of the differences.
8. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 224n (West 1970).
9. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1400-1410 and 1440-1443 (West 1972).
10. See San Diego Dept. of Pub. Wel. v. Super. Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 1, 496

P.3d 453 (1972); Guardianship of Henwood, 49 Cal. 2d 639, 320 P.2d 1
(1958) and Adoption of Pierce, 15 Cal. App. 3d 244, 93 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1971).
11. Guardianship of Henwood, supra, note 10.

wished to keep the children but the agency disapproved on the
basis of the grandparents' age. The grandparents could not adopt
the children because they could not file a petition for adoption.
Under Civil Code Section 224n, once a child has been relinquished,
no petition for adoption can be filed except by the persons with
whom the agency has placed the child. 12 This particular code
section affects the jurisdiction of the court. It cannot hear any
petition filed in violation thereof. Subsequently, the grandparents
filed a petition for guardianship which the court granted.
The primary reason compelling the court to grant the grandparents' petition was the unadoptability of the children. The court
took judicial notice of this circumstance. Although not explicitly
stated in the case, the court was influenced by the probable future
of the children under agency custody; a succession of foster homes
with the possibility of the children being separated, or institutionalization until adulthood.
The opinion in Henwood, however, was cautious. The criteria
formulated for the appointment of a guardian after relinquishment
were limited to the facts of that case. There had to be a showing
either that the children were unadoptable or the agency was unfit.13
The inadequacy of these criteria and the need for more flexibility
were illustrated in Guardianshipof Runyon,14 a case decided under
the Henwood rule.
The minor in Runyon was relinquished at birth to an adoption
agency. Thereafter, he was placed with foster parents with whom
he spent eight years. The prospective parents wished to adopt him,
but the agency considered them unsuitable. They could not file
an adoption petition because the agency refused to place the child
with them. After eight years the agency found people willing to
adopt the child. The foster parents then filed a petition for guardianship. The court, following Henwood, denied the petition since
the child was obviously adoptable.
The result reached in Runyon was inconsistent with the concept
of promoting the child's welfare. Few would contend that severing
an eight-year relationship would promote the child's security and
emotional stability. Realizing the need for a less narrow standard,
12. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 224n (West 1970).
13. The CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE does not provide for the appointment of

a guardian after relinquishment. The authority for the appointment stems
from CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1405-1406 (West 1972), which provides for the
appointment of a guardian whenever necessary and convenient and gives

as the standard the best interests of the child.
14. Adoption of Runyon, 268 Cal. App. 2d 918, 74 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1969).
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the court, in a recent decision, has broadened the Henwood standard.
In the case of San Diego Department of Public Welfare v. Superior Court,15 the child was placed for adoption by the natural
mother with prospective adoptive parents. The baby was well
cared for for almost two years before all pre-adoption proceedings
were completed. However, the natural mother had never signed
a consent form, a jurisdictional prerequisite in an independent
adoption. 1 6 The adoption agency induced the natural mother to
refuse to sign the required consent form for the adoption and procured a relinquishment from her. The adoptive parents had filed
a petition for adoption prior to the relinquishment and a petition
17
for guardianship subsequent thereto.
The adoption agency initiated a proceeding to gain custody of the
child, but the court, departing from Henwood, appointed the
prospective adoptive parents guardians, specifically finding the
child adoptable without a showing of agency unfitness. In the
opinion, the court stated that the best interests of the child would
be promoted by the guardianship and that it would be contrary to
the spirit of Henwood to hold otherwise. The holding in San Diego
has introduced a flexibility into adoption law which could not be
15. San Diego Dept. of Pub. Wel. v. Super. Ct., supra, note 10.
16. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 226.1 (West 1973) for the method of giving
consent in an independent adoption. Reference has frequently been made
to agency versus independent adoption. The primary difference is the role
of the adoption agency. In an independent adoption the mother (or the
father or both) chooses the adoptive parents and places the child with
them. These private parties have the primary responsibility for initiating
and completing the adoption. In an agency adoption the child is relinquished to the agency which then has the responsibility of caring for the
child, placing it and initiating and completing the adoption. In both instances, however, the agency has an investigative function and must report
to the court.
17. The time for filing an adoption petition where there has been an
independent placement and then a relinquishment is crucial. If the petition is filed prior to the relinquishment the agency has no control over the
adoption except an investigative one. If the petition is filed after relinquishment the agency has complete control over the child and can halt the
adoption if it so desires. This is an excellent illustration of the differences
between agency and independent adoptions. A relinquishment after an
independent placement where no adoption petition has been filed prior to
the relinquishment transforms an independent adoption into an agency
adoption.

achieved under Henwood. The only showing which need now be
made is that the guardianship after relinquishment is necessary to
promote the child's welfare.
The most difficult problem with the San Diego test will arise in
the application to future cases. To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical.
A child is placed with prospective adoptive parents by the natural
parents. There is a subsequent relinquishment to an adoption
agency, but a failure to file an adoption petition by the prospective
parents prior to such relinquishment. The prospective parents now
file a guardianship petition with the court. What result on the
guardianship petition? If the court grants the petition, it is impliedly holding the guardianship preferable to adoption. The
guardians cannot adopt because the agency has not placed the child
with them. What has been identified as a meaningful and emotional relationship between the guardians and the child has begun, and as the child becomes older he becomes less adoptable.
There is a strong possibility under these circumstances that the
child will never be adopted even though there might be persons
who desire to adopt.
The Henwood court was not unaware of this difficulty and commented on it in dicta. However, it was of minor importance in that
case since the children had only a slight chance for adoption under
agency custody anyway. This difficulty was also absent in San
Diego. There, the adoption was pending, the adoption petition
having been filed prior to the relinquishment. The agency could
not have prevented that adoption if the court found it to be in the
best interests of the child.' 8 The guardianship petition in San
Diego was granted to prevent a transfer of custody to. the agency
while the adoption proceeded. A case which would require a court
to choose between guardianship and adoption has not yet arisen
for decision under the broader criteria. The decision a court will
reach in this situation can be discussed only in terms of probability,
taking into account the factors likely to influence a court.
Among an infinite variety of factors, the age of the child is likely
to be important in determining whether a guardianship petition
should be granted. In this respect Henwood will continue to have
vitality although it has been superseded by San Diego. The older
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 226.8 (West 1963) provides for review by the
Superior Court where the agency recommends denial of an adoption petition. The court can grant or deny the petition depending on the best interests of the child, but giving due weight to the recommendation.
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the child the less its chances for adoption. Thus the court would
find less difficulty in granting the guardianship petition where an
older child is involved. However, where the agency has found people willing to adopt the child regardless of age, this factor is not
important. Of paramount importance in this situation is the nature
and duration of the relationship between the prospective guardian
and the child. Courts are reluctant to sever long and continued
relationships and this may be true even if the child could be
adopted. The longer the relationship the more reluctance on the
part of the court to sever it. Additional considerations here would
be the greater suitability of either the prospective guardians or
the prospective adoptive parents chosen by the agency. Also the
legal advantages to the child in being adopted would be a factor.
The granting of a guardianship petition which would preserve the
child's environment but prevent an adoption is an inadequate solution to this problem. The fact that the court could be presented
with such a difficult choice indicates a pressing need for a modification of that part of Section 224n of the Civil Code which prohibits
the filing of an adoption petition after relinquishment except by
those persons with whom the agency has placed the child. 19 This
particular code section is the heart of the problem. The problem
could be remedied by an addition to the code allowing those persons who have had a continuing relation with the child, which in
all respects is identical to parenthood, to file an adoption petition
even if there has been a relinquishment subsequent to the advent
of this relationship. The time for the filing of a petition is a mere
fortuitous event which should not be allowed to control the future
of a child. So long as an adoption agency can sever a relationship
between a child and those acting as his parent without a court review, there can be no guarantee that the welfare and interests of
the child will be given full consideration.
. The legislative purpose behind that area of Section 224n under
discussion is to prevent competition for the child by a multitude
19. The relevant part of CAL. CIV. CODE § 224n (West 1970) reads, "No
petition may be filed to adopt a child relinquished to a licensed adoption
agency. .

. .,

except by the the prospective adoptive parents with whom

the child has been placed for adoption by the adoption agency." This particular part withstood constitutional attack on the grounds of due process
and equal protection in Adoption of Runyon, supra,note 13.

of parties who want to adopt and to promote order in procedure. 20
Neither purpose would be frustrated by allowing those persons who
are acting as parents without an actual adoptive placement or who
have had a child placed with them by the natural mother pursuant
to an independent adoption, to file an adoption petition if the child
has been subsequently relinquished. It makes little difference who
has placed the child or whether there has been a formal placement
at all. The most important consideration is the child and the relationship that has developed, not the adoption agency and its desires. 2 1 The remedy suggested can be supported as consistent with
the child's welfare since it would promote emotional stability and
security for the child by providing continuity of relationship and
environment. It would also be consistent with the idea which has
found acceptance in the legislature that the court is to determine
what is in the child's interests. 22 The agency, by not placing the
child with those persons who have already had a continuing relationship with it, is deciding what is in the child's best interest.
This crucial consideration should be left to an unbiased body and
the court is peculiarly suited to this function. Allowing guardians
to file an adoption petition, of course, will not insure an adoption
by them. What it will insure, however, is that the child's welfare
will be decided by an unbiased judge. Once the petition is before
the court it is the court that decides whether the adoption petition
should be granted and the only criterion used for this determination is the best interest of the child.
It may be that a legislative change in Civil Code Section 224n
20. The legislature made no comment in CAL. STATS. 1955, C. 949 P. 1835,
§ 1 as to the purpose of the statutory addition. However, it is obvious that
if there were no provision such as that under discussion, there would be
considerable chaos if anyone could walk into adoption facilities and pick the
child they desire. This rationale does not apply to the suggested change

since the child would be residing already with those who desired to file an
adoption petition. The suggested change would not abrogate this legitimate
purpose of the statute.
21. The court is cognizant of the fact that emotional attachments do not
await an official imprimatur. In Sacramento Super. Ct. v. Dept. of Soc.
Wel., supra, note 6 at 41, the court said: "Gain of a child for adoption fulfills the prospective parents' most cherished hopes. The event marks the
onset of a close and meaningful relationship. The emotional investment
does not await the ultimate decree of adoption. Love and mutual dependence set in ahead of official cachets, administrative or judicial."
The court is also cognizant of the fact that adoption agencies are not always unbiased. In Guardianship of Henwood, supra, note 10 at 644, the
court said: "We cannot assume that adoption agencies will necessarily in

all cases have such wisdom and competence that they may be set apart
from other custodians and given carte blanche in their control of relinquished children until a petition for adoption is before the court."
22. See supra note 5.
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will be the only method to assure that the adoptive child and the
prospective adoptive parents in. a guardianship capacity will have
an opportunity to culminate an existing satisfactory relationship
through adoption. In addition, the court may feel that to grant a
guardianship petition which will prevent a certain or possible adopttion flies in the face of the statute, and it will be reluctant to act
under these circumstances. There is no easy solution to this problem which must await future court determinations.
DEVELOPMENTS IN ABANDONMENT PROCEEDINGS

The historical development of the "child's best interest" philosophy in the field of adoption law has been a slow process of
filling in gaps in the law for the protection of the child. No code,
no matter how comprehensive, can predict and encompass all fact
situations likely to arise under it. Thus, there exists the necessity
for piecemeal legislation. In 1965, the legislature enacted Civil
Code Section 232.5 which closed one gap in the law dealing with
abandonment.
Usually, an adoption requires the consent of the parents. Where,
however, a child has been judicially declared free from the custody
and control of its parents, consent to an adoption by the parents
is not required. 23 Various parental shortcomings can serve as
grounds for declaring a child free from custody and control of the
parents. 23 Among these are abandonment, cruel treatment and
neglect, moral depravity, felony conviction with a long prison sentence and mental illness or deficiency. 24 Abandonment is the
ground upon which this article will focus.
Civil Code Section 232.5 mandates the court to liberally construe
Section 232 of the Civil Code, along With other sections of the same
chapter of which abandonment is a subdivision in order to serve
and protect the interests and welfare of the child. Prior to the
enactment of the statute, subdivision (a) 'was construed in favor
of the natural rights of the parent.25 Section 232.5 has its corollary
in the case of Adoption of Barnett.25a In that case, the court abro23. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 224 (West 1970) which sets out the conditions
under which consent is dispensed with.
24. These grounds are set out in CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West 1971).
25. See In re Bisenius, supra, note 2..
25a. Adoption of Barnett, supra, note 3.

gated the common law rule that the adoption statutes were to be
construed in favor of the rights and interests of the natural parents.
The court adopted as its standard the philosophy of the best interest of the child.
A great deal of time and research were spent in attempting to
collect and analyze cases decided under Civil Code Section 232.5,
and only four such cases could be found. 26 Of these the first has
no appellate decision, the second was decided on the basis of earlier
opinions handed down before the enactment of Section 232.5 and
the third commented on the statute only in dicta.2 7 However, Section 232.5 was the deciding factor in declaring the child abandoned
in Adoption of Morrow, and a comparison of Morrow and cases decided before the enactment of Section 232.5 indicates a departure
from previous law.
The child in Morrow was born in 1958 and declared a ward of the
juvenile court in 1964, based on parental neglect. The wardship
lasted for four years before the child was declared abandoned so
the adoption could proceed. The natural mother requested permission to see the child but permission was refused. She requested a
second time to visit the child and was refused again. Based on
these facts the child was declared abandoned for failure to communicate within the statutory period required in subdivision (a) of
Civil Code Section 232.
On similar facts in other cases decided under the same subdivision, the court has consistently refused to sustain the abandonment
petition. Consider In Re Williams.28 In that case the mother left
the child with friends so she could search for a job. The friends,
without the mother's knowledge, turned the child over to the welfare authorities. When the mother returned, she endeavored to get
the child back. The welfare department refused to return the child
and would not permit her to visit him. The child was then made
a ward of the juvenile court. Abandonment proceedings were
brought against the mother under Section 701 (a) of the Welfare and
Institutions Code but the court denied the petition.29 The court
26. Sluis v. Welch, Cal. App. Rpts. Jan. 22, 1973 at 10, Adoption of

Oukes, 14 Cal. App. 3d 459, 92 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1971), In re Morrow, 9 Cal.
App. 3d 39, 88 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1970), and In re Neal, 265 Cal. App. 2d 482,
71 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1968).

27. Sluis v. Welch, Adoption of Oukes, and In re Neal, supra, note 26,
respectively. In regard to the Oukes case compare In re Gano, 160 Cal.
App. 2d 700, 325 P.2d 485 (1958), and In re Sanders, 88 Cal. Rptr. 251, 198
P.2d 523 (1948).
28. In re Williams, 133 Cal. App. 2d 515, 284 P.2d 510 (1955).
29. Re-enacted into CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West 1961). It should be
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stated that the actions of the mother did not come within the code
section. That section contemplates a voluntary leaving on the
part of the parents. Since the child was made a ward of the juvenile court there was no leaving within the meaning of subdivision
(a) of the code. In arriving at its decision the court stressed the
actions of the welfare authorities in refusing the mother visitation rights with the child.
Similarly in In Re Jones,80 the parents of the child were divorced
and custody was granted to the father. The father then remarried
and brought abandonment proceedings for failure on the part of the
mother to communicate within the statutory period. The court
denied the petition on the grounds that one of the necessary elements to constitute abandonment was not satisfied. Since custody
was awarded by court decree, the child was not "left" within the
3
meaning of the statute. '
There are several elements which must be satisfied before a child
can be declared abandoned: the child must be left by his parents
in the care and custody of another without provision for support
or without communication for a period of six months, with intent
to abandon.32 It is clear from Jones and Williams that the word
"left" in the statute has been interpreted to mean a voluntary leaving and if there was no voluntary leaving by the parent there could
be no abandonment. It is equally clear that the court in Morrow
has given the word "left by the parent" an interpretation different
noted that In re Gano, supra, note 27, and In re Sanders, supra, note 27,
were decided under 701 of the CAL. WELF. & INSTiT. CODE but that § 232 and
§ 701 are the same in all essentials.
30. In re Jones, 131 Cal. App. 2d 831, 281 P.2d 310 (1955).
31. In accord with In re Jones, supra, note 30, and In re Williams,
supra, note 28, are Matter of Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 126 P. 161 (1912), and
In re Cattalini, 72 Cal. App. 2d 662, 165 P.2d 250 (1946). In Cozza, the
step-father of the children had them declared wards of the juvenile court.
Representations were made to the mother by the welfare authorities that
she could do nothing and could not visit the child until the end of the
year. She tried to get permission but it was denied. The persons having
custody got the child declared abandoned and adopted her. The court overturned the adoption holding that the statutes must be construed in favor of
the natural parents and that there was no abandonment because the child

was not "left" as required by the code. In Cattalini the parents were divorced, as in Jones, and the wife tried to get the child declared abandoned
so her new husband could adopt him. The court held there was no voluntary leaving and refused to sustain the abandonment petition.
32.

See CAL.CIv. CODE § 232(a) (West 1961).

from that in prior cases. The Morrow court gave great weight to
the fact that the child had been voluntarily placed in the care and
custody of another and lightly considered that it had not been "left
by the parent." The court glossed over this technical requirement
of the statute. The whole attitude of the case suggests that since
the conduct of the parents in the first instance was responsible for
the wardship which necessitated placing the child elsewhere, the
child really was "left by the parent," although derivatively. This
reasoning is similar to that used in In Re Maxwell 3 and In Re Barton.3 4 In both cases the child was declared abandoned after it was
made a ward of the juvenile court. No effort or only token effort
was made by the parents to communicate with the child and neither
faced strenuous opposition from the welfare authorities. The court
in sustaining the abandonment petition said that although the leaving in the first instance was not a leaving within the meaning of
the code, the inaction by the parents amounted to such leaving.
Cases like Jones and Williams, where the abandonment petitions
were not sustained because the child was taken by court decree,
were distinguished on the grounds that the parents desired and attempted to see the child. Morrow is distinguishable on the same
grounds.
Even though the court finds as a matter of law that the child has
been left in the care and custody of another, there can be no abandonment unless there has been a failure to communicate or a failure to support concurrent with the leaving.3. In Morrow, the mother
had failed to communicate for a period of time longer than the mininum required by the statute. The particular circumstances surrounding this failure to communicate, however, have always elicited the sympathy of the court. The mother of the child in Morrow had been told by the welfare authorities that she could not
visit the child. Former courts have realized that the welfare authorities represent authority to those people who deal with them.
Consequently in the past, courts have scrutinized the actions of the
welfare department to ascertain whether the failure to communicate was the fault of the parent or the welfare authorities. Where
it was found that the welfare department made it difficult or impossible to communicate (for instance by giving false advice to the
parents as to their legal rights or concealing the location of the
child), this circumstance was considered a legitimate excuse for

33. In re Maxwell, 117 Cal. App. 2d 156, 255 P.2d 87 (1953).
34. In re Barton, 168 Cal. App. 2d 584, 336 P.2d 210 (1959).

35. See CAL. CIV.

CODE

§ 232(a) (West 1961).
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failure to communicate.36 The court refused to sanction this excuse
in Morrow, despite the support of precedent, saying the burden was
on the parent to question the instructions of the welfare department. There was an additional factor in Morrow of the mother's
deteriorating mental condition. Prior cases have also considered
this factor an excuse for failure to communicate based on inability,
but the Morrow court refused to consider this element, merely
finding the ability to communicate despite the emotional instabil37

ity.

The lack of sympathy for the parent in Morrow indicates a
change in judicial attitude. This is the most significant aspect of
the case. The emphasis has shifted from a technical interpretationof statutes which favors the rights and interests of the natural parents to one which more readily considers the needs of the child.
The court did not fail to take notice of the fact that a parental rela- tionship had developed between the child and those who cared for
her under wardship. A natural substitution took place. Courts have not always been considerate of the relationship which arises
when a child is placed in the care of another. The Morrow court
summed up its feeling concerning the relationship which had arisen
under wardship by upholding the opinion of the trial court which
found "the best interests of the child control under Section 232.5,
which would be promoted by granting the abandonment petition
so the adoption could proceed."
The effects of Morrow and Section 232.5 cannot be analyzed more
fully until a larger body of case law is developed. However, thecase is a significant step toward ensuring emotional stability and
security for the child which has been lacking in the past. The pre-ceding years have documented a steady erosion of the pre-eminence
of the rights of natural parents concept with a corresponding emphasis on the child's welfare. Morrow is consistent with this trend.
If future cases are decided in this spirit we can expect the court '
to continue to subordinate form to substance and to focus on the
child as the primary recipient of the court's concern.
DARLENE SELBY

36. See Matter of Cozza, supra, note 31, and In re Williams, supra, note
28.
37. See Adoption of Smith, 270 Cal. App. 2d 605, 75 Cal. Rptr. 900
(1969).

